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Abstract: 
The 17th CITES conference of the parties exhibited a draconian opposition to any 
trade in ivory. A key component of this opposition was the intergovernmental regime’s 
consolidation of North-South power differentials through the increased presence and 
influence of Northern conservation-focused NGOs. Using the example of ivory, this forum 
article unpacks this dynamic, before advocating for more participatory, decentralised, and 
polycentric approaches to the global governance of endangered species trade at future CITES 
CoPs. 
 
Forum Article:  
 
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) views trade 
and biodiversity conservation as reconcilable entities (Sand, 1997). Nevertheless, that balance 
does not always play out. CITES’ 2016 Johannesburg-based conference of the parties 
(CoP17), showed a draconian opposition to any trade in ivory, to the detriment of a minority 
of Southern, pro-trade actors. The contest over whether to allow ivory trade or not revealed 
strong power differentials between the Global North and Global South, a point that has been 
made repeatedly in research on CITES and other international environmental regime 




area by demonstrating how CITES CoP17 specifically increased North-South power 
differentials, and even sought to normalise them, through increased presence and influence of 
non-state actors in this CoP.  
 
During the ivory trade debate, state and non-state actor coalitions – with increased 
leverage of Northern conservation-focused NGOs – exercised institutional, structural, and 
discursive power to delimit acceptable policy prescriptions within CITES, silencing dissent 
and deepening North-South inequalities (Boström and Hallström, 2010). Catalysed by 
concerns surrounding problems implementing trade regulations (Reeve, 2006), and 
undergirded by Haas’ (1992) notion of epistemic communities, we characterise CoP17 as a 
hegemonic governance coalition which reifies North-South power asymmetries under the 
guise of environmental conservation (Epstein, 2006; Holmes, 2011). In response to calls for 
more decentralised, polycentric approaches to the global governance of endangered species 
trade (Abensperg-Traun, 2009), we conclude by advocating for a more participatory 
governance architecture within CITES. 
 
CITES 
Established in 1973, CITES signifies the emergence of extinction anxieties, a 
concomitant transboundary biodiversity ‘crisis’, and collective-action problem requiring a 
harmonious, unified, and global response (Reeve, 2006). This interpretation is underscored 
by the belief that ‘wild flora and fauna … are an irreplaceable part of the natural systems of 
the earth which must be protected for this and the generations to come’ (CITES, 1973:1, 
emphasis added), an intergenerational temporality which pre-dates the Brundtland Report 
(WCED, 1987). As a ground-breaking multi-lateral environmental agreement, CITES 
stipulates that international trade in species is dependent on their classification within two 
key appendices; with Appendix I prohibiting commercial trade in species threatened by 
extinction, and Appendix II permitting regulated trade of species not currently threatened by 
extinction (CITES, 1973:1-2). The decision to up-list/down-list species between these 
appendices is the primary concern of CITES’ biennial/triennial CoPs, which provide a forum 
for dialogue between states with competing interests, enabling ‘open, transparent, evidence-
based and multilateral’ decision-making procedures to ensue (CITES-WTO, 2015:6).  
 
Each CoP is facilitated by a UNEP-delegated secretariat, who operates as an 




actors, operationalise scientific expertise, and provide impartial guidance. Crucially, bar 
‘exceptional circumstances’ which permit the promotion of trade, CITES regulations regulate 
trade, underpinned by the belief that ‘peoples and States are and should be the best protectors 
of their own wild flora and fauna’ (CITES, 1973:1). This dovetails with CITES’ faith in 
market-led solutions to sustainability (enshrined within Appendix II), positing economic 
growth (through trade) and biodiversity protection as reconcilable entities (Velásquez-Gomar 
and Stringer, 2011). Therefore, in re-affirming purported synergies between trade, the 
environment, and development, CITES posits social, economic, and environmental interests 
as compatible through ‘sustainable trade’ (CITES-WTO, 2015:11). Nevertheless, a notable 
dichotomy has emerged between anti-use protectionists and pro-use trade advocates 
(Bowman, 2013).  
 
Well before CoP17, scholars problematised the dominant role of the Global North in 
regulation via CITES. Roe (2006:27) contends that ‘given that the general direction of 
wildlife trade flows is from developing to developed countries, unilateral measures imposed 
by consumer countries … can smack of Northern imperialism’. Duffy (2013) laments the role 
of Northern environmental NGOs within CITES’ negotiation processes, redolent of a colonial 
present shrouded beneath a veil of interstate cooperation.  
 
CoP17, ivory, and non-state actors 
CoP17 pitted Northern conservationists and the ‘29-member African Elephant 
Coalition’ (Korwin et al., 2017:140) against the pro-Ivory trade bloc (comprising Namibia, 
Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and South Africa). Pro-trade advocates advanced a counter-
hegemonic narrative emblazoned under a pragmatic, common sense rationale to resume ivory 
trade, eliding with the assertion that trade bans prevent the ‘sensible legal utilization of a 
valuable self-generating natural resource thus contradicting the very concept and meaning of 
conservation… not preventing its illegal utilization but supporting it’ (CITES, 2016b:4-5). 
Biggs (2016) contextualises this notion, exploring ivory trade as a polarising governance 
issue characterised by pro-use proponents who suggest that indiscriminate banning of ivory 
paradoxically incentivises poaching by reducing supply and increasing prices (Seguya et al., 
2016). Cooney and Jepson expound this narrative, suggesting that CoP17’s blanket bans will 
stimulate further illegal activity, positioning trade-bans as counter-productive, ‘appealingly 





The ban on ivory trade agreed at CoP17 reflects the outcome of struggles for 
discursive hegemony between actors with competing interests (Hajer, 1995:59), a dynamic 
consolidated by CoP17 continuing a trend towards more hybridised governance coalitions 
within global governance. In challenging the state-centric legacy of multilateralism, and 
paralleling a wider post-Paris trend toward polycentric governance (Ostrom, 2010; Oberthür, 
2016), CoP17 boasted 183 Parties (182 nation-states and the EU) and numerous non-state 
actors. Concordant with Kuyper et al.’s (2018:2) notion of ‘hybrid multilateralism’ and a 
broader shift towards post-Westphalian governance landscapes, CoP17 spliced state and non-
state actors, producing reconfigured actor coalitions, rhetorically promoting participation and 
strengthening representation to engender accountability, enhance transparency, augment 
compliance, and affect outcomes.  
 
Nasiritousi et al. (2016:920) embellish this narrative, explicating three key rationales 
for CITES’ inclusion of non-state actors, centred around the reduction of a perceived 
legitimacy deficit within global governance:  
(1) Functionalism (‘the contribution of non-state actors to output legitimacy in terms 
of expertise’),  
(2) Neocorporatism (emphasising ‘the inclusion of affected interests’), and  
(3) Democratic pluralism (which ‘claims that non-state actors increase input 
legitimacy through procedural values’).  
Working from this framework, we contend that CoP17 was plagued by a logic of 
functionalism, to the detriment of neocorporatism and democratic pluralism.  
 
In concordance with Duffy (2013), NGOs exercised structural power (Boström and 
Hallström’s, 2010) at CoP17 to propagate a narrative which downplayed inter-state 
antagonisms, overlooking Southern state’s dissenting voices in favour of homogenous, 
unrepresentative narratives which reproduced and deepened global inequalities. Indeed, 
whilst the WWF (2016) acknowledged the monopoly of Northern interests at CoP17, the 
NGO re-inscribed this dynamic by staunchly opposing the legalisation of ivory trade. As 
such, they idolised the proposed instatement of the ‘National Ivory Action Plan’ process as a 
viable alternative to functionally monocentric governance arrangements, lauded as enhancing 





Resultantly, CoP17 re-engrained a dyad between activist-oriented conservation claims 
and kill-to-save sustainable-use advocates in the governance of endangered species (Bauer et 
al., 2017), contextualising Depledge’s assertion that international regimes are prone to 
ossification, as expressed by ‘rancorous relationships, stagnating issues and stifled debates’ 
(2006:1). Indeed, CoP17’s outcomes were dependent on scientific expertise to provide a 
legitimising force, which substantiated moral claims and delegitimised counter-hegemonic 
narratives (Duffy, 2013:225). This dynamic is exemplified by CITES’ unwavering faith in 
the precautionary principle as a rationality of governance, a tool which delimits acceptable 
policy outcomes through the ability to take decisions in the absence of scientific certainty 
(van Asselt and Vos, 2006).  
 
The role of scientific expertise in supporting the Global North’s position manifest 
itself through CoP17’s reliance on seemingly neutral and uncontested science surrounding the 
implications of ivory trade – a normative failing which side-lined distributive justice 
concerns (Rawls, 1971). This masked the inherently political implications of up-listing 
particular species, invoking a crudely utilitarian logic through rejection of the decision-
making mechanism for a process of trade in ivory. This downplayed the trade bloc’s 
misgivings surrounding the need for positive incentives for landholders to co-exist with, 
rather than displace elephants, and revenues generated from elephant-based products used to 
finance conservation programmes (CITES, 2016c:2). This approach silences alternative 
narratives and re-entrenches the power asymmetries underpinning neoliberal governance 
systems.   
 
CoP17 mobilised Northern conservation expertise ‘as a powerful political weapon to 
silence alternative views and deepen existing unequal power relations produced by a 
neoliberal global system’ (Duffy, 2013:236), consonant with an understanding of how 
apocalyptic imaginaries facilitate ‘depoliticised action in the present’ (de Goede and Randalls 
2009:860). This reliance on scientific expertise reflects the prevalence of an eco-centric 
epistemic community at CoP17, conferring a ‘network of professionals with recognised 
expertise and competence … an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that 
domain or issue-area’ (Haas, 1992:3). This was typified by NGOs engaging in soft-steering 
activities, relying on scientific expertise to provide a ‘reasoned argument that persuades 
dissenters of a particular policy position’ (Duffy, 2013:225). For example, at CoP17 Western 




(CITES, 2016a), producing anticipatory analyses of the ramifications of proposals to change 
trade rules, underscoring the potentially ‘dangerous’ nature of re-igniting controlled ivory 
trade (Bauer et al., 2017:3). In excoriating a veneer of scientific neutrality underpinning 
CoP17 regulations, this exposes a troubling affinity with a post-political dialectic 
(Swyngedouw, 2010), preserving hegemonic governance arrangements and discrediting 
counter-arguments to produce seemingly ‘universally applicable and technically inspired 
regulations’ (Duffy, 2013:236).  
 
Implications for future CITES governance 
 
CoP17’s hegemonic governance coalition downplayed discursive divergences both 
between and amongst the global North and South, culminating in the rejection of a more 
representative, case-specific governance paradigm. Unfortunately, this cannot be seen as an 
example of having ‘all hands on deck’, as has been suggested in relation to other 
environmental negotiations (Hale, 2016), but is more akin to pirate capture of the ship’s deck. 
In response to the trend towards increased elitist technocracy in CITES, there is a need to re-
shake ‘the kaleidoscope of environmental governance … multiplying the crystals it contains’ 
(Castree, 2015:312) to broaden the constellation of non-state actors and diversify relevant 
expertise at future CITES CoPs – increasing attention to the aforementioned neocorporatism.  
Consequently, analysis of CoP17 suggests that there is no one panacea for the successful 
governance of trade in endangered species (Biggs, 2016). There is, however, a need for more 
experimental governance approaches that challenge the prevalence of one-size-fits-all 
policies in governance of endangered species trade.   
 
These recommendations are particularly pertinent given CoP18’s (2019, Geneva) 
imposition of stricter regulations regarding domestic measures and inter-state ivory trade 
(CITES, 2019). In this case, anti-trade proponents utilised NGO lobbying power to 
marginalise the South African Development Community’s public concerns that anti-trade 
legislation threatens ‘national sovereignty, inclusive and equitable development, and the 
rights of local communities living with wildlife to use those resources’ (IISD, 2019:27). This 
reinforces the need to challenge CITES’ proclivity for top-down, implicitly monocentric, and 
bureaucratic governance arrangements in favour of multi-scalar, polycentric governance 
coalitions that will diversifying non-state involvement and further democratise environmental 
governance (Ostrom, 2010). This intersects with the need for biodiversity agreements to 




reification of established preservationist interests in favour of empowering historically 
marginalised perspectives of conservation through use as a means of satiating democratic 
principles. 
 
Invoking a reconfigured spatial grammar (Bulkeley, 2005) and logic of democratic 
pluralism (Willetts, 2006), we recommend development of enhanced context-specific 
decision-making procedures to ensure that CITES regulations reflect the ‘socio-economic and 
cultural complexity of wildlife trade’ (Challender et al., 2015:130). This could be achieved 
by initiating a new process of trade in ivory which incorporates procedural and distributive 
justice claims. This proposition is underpinned by the belief that CoP17’s outcomes, like 
previous CITES CoPs, signify a reliance on ‘power rather than reasoned argument’ (Gehring 
and Ruffing, 2008:124), carving eristic divides between nation-states.  The rise of influence 
of non-state actors in CoP17, particularly scientific expertise, has even further narrowed 
‘debate to the application of trade controls’ (Challender et al., 2015:142) - preserving their 
status as purveyors of apolitical knowledge.   
 
Conclusion 
 Catalysed by Duffy’s (2013) contention that CITES CoPs tacitly re-inscribe North-
South power asymmetries, rendering Southern nations states as both subjects and objects of 
governance, we have critiqued CoP17’s ban on ivory trade in 2016. Importantly, we contend 
that CITES’ inclusion of non-state actors is not inherently negative, but that their 
involvement at CoP17 indulged a limited Northern perspective, and re-inscribed unequal 
power dynamics – despite both pro and anti-trade argumentation being inherently justifiable. 
This led us to champion a logic of democratic pluralism through advocacy for more 
experimental governance approaches. Reflective of a desire to promulgate more balanced, 
heterogeneous, and polycentric governance structures, this has underscored a need to 
dismantle North-South dichotomies of difference in favour of more representative 
environmental governance arrangements without threatening the welfare of endangered 
species or impeding timely decision-making procedures. As such, we propose the explicit 
incorporation of conservation-based expertise within CITES regulations, prioritising locally-
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